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Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press have aroused sharp and widespread 
criticism throughout Russia over the thesis put forward by “The Rise of  U.S. 
Nuclear Primacy.” 1 The authors conclusion that “…it probably will soon be 
possible for the United States to destroy the long-range nuclear arsenals of  
Russia or China with a first strike” has been seen in Russia not only as flawed 
logically and based on questionable methodology, but even irresponsible with 
regard to its affect on U.S.-Russian relations. While the Russian commenta-
tors were quick to dismiss the substantive aspect of  the Press/Lieber nuclear 
primacy argument, they also rushed into speculation as to why the article was 
published and opinion about how unwise it was to do so.
A number of  Russian technical experts, including Victor Esin, Vladimir 
Dvorkin and Pavel Podvig, focus on the argument that the American authors 
underestimated Russia’s current nuclear potential.2 They believe that the article 
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has exaggerated the degraded state of  Russia’s arsenal and early warning sys-
tem.  More conservative voices within the Russian political spectrum (such as 
retired Gen. Leonid Ivashov) also dismiss the emergence of  nuclear primacy, 
reasoning that American nuclear primacy is presently a fiction, although it 
may emerge in the future, especially if  Russia’s own national defense remains 
underfunded.3 Stoking mutual suspicion and justifying greater funding for 
relevant arms programs are exactly what worries some. Yegor Gaidar plainly 
defined the article as a provocation and complained how much it could un-
dermine liberal pro-Western forces in Russia.4 Sergey Karaganov, a prominent 
strategist, goes even further by suggesting that the article was actually intended 
to provoke Russia into wasting more money on ambitious military programs 
and to promote anti-American isolationist forces who would internally restrain 
Russia from having an active foreign policy, or to impede Russian-Chinese 
relations by showing China how weak and vulnerable Russia is.5  
In short, many commentators in Russia took this article as a sort of  test 
for Russia presented by the U.S. political/defense establishment. Yet unfor-
tunately, while these rebuttals to American nuclear primacy gripped Russia’s 
own experts, the controversy did not elicit a deeper discussion: that is, the 
question of  the present nature of  U.S.-Russian relations under the paradigm 
of  mutually assured destruction (MAD) and the unknown future beyond. 
Au Revoir to MAD?
Mutually assured destruction is a balance of  nuclear forces such that no one 
can win a nuclear war through first or second strike. Under the conditions of  
MAD, initiating a nuclear war would entail committing suicide and therefore 
cannot be a rational decision. Conversely, it is highly rational to demonstrate 
a technical, political and moral capability to dissuade a potential enemy from 
launching a nuclear first strike. This means that nuclear strategies within the 
MAD framework are defensive by definition.
The emergence of  MAD from a concept into reality coincided with the era 
when the United States and the Soviet Union reached a state of  nuclear parity. 
To be sure, such a nuclear balance was never based on a strict calculation, 
yet the size and quality of  each country’s arsenal guaranteed that the imbal-
ances that existed in specific systems or “legs” of  their nuclear triads did not 
compromise the basic architecture of  absolute nuclear stalemate.
It follows logically that an erosion of  this nuclear parity between the 
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United States and Russia would have consequences for MAD. The disparity 
in the levels of  nuclear capability at which MAD ceases to exist is certainly a 
complex question. During the height of  the Cold War, Russia and the United 
States had the nuclear forces to annihilate each other five times over. Presently, 
those capabilities have been reduced to the ability to destroy each other two 
and four times over, respectively. This relative gap likely has no real impact 
on MAD. However, a disparity in nuclear forces of  the kind where one side’s 
ability to retaliate is destroyed in a first strike may fundamentally change the 
calculus of  MAD. 
Overwhelming superiority, on the other hand, does not guarantee zero re-
taliation. Nuclear superiority may minimize the chances of  retaliation. Missile 
defense may even further diminish the possibility of  a second strike. Yet, 
absolute nuclear primacy – when there will be a high probability of  zero retali-
ation – is impossible with thousands of  deployed warheads. Relative nuclear 
primacy, where one side can conceivably win a nuclear war, also means that 
retaliation would lead to “acceptable damage.” But this opens up the question 
of  what exactly that level of  acceptable damage, or the “pain threshold,” 
is for the United States. Currently, the prevailing view is that even a single 
nuclear explosion (presumably of  hundreds of  kilotons yield) in any of  the 
large American cities represents a level of  damage unacceptable to the United 
States. With such a low pain threshold, reliance on nuclear primacy looks 
highly dubious. Nuclear primacy then, whether achieved or not, accidental or 
intentional, may be a great strategic disappointment, as the existing low pain 
threshold will not provide the opportunity for strategic benefit.  A search 
for nuclear primacy then becomes a waste of  taxpayers’ money and security 
apparatus effort.
Despite flaws in the technical aspects of  MAD, it will remain, from a politi-
cal perspective, the only viable concept for the time being. A real, material 
erosion of  MAD, let alone its elimination, will take time and for the foresee-
able future MAD will continue to be the strategic framework between the 
nuclear powers.
Alternatives to MAD?
Mutually assured destruction will remain dominant in the international 
security system, but only while it is a strategy of  necessity. MAD cannot be 
a strategy of  choice. It is impossible to imagine that a rational government 
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Even a single nuclear 
explosion in a large 
American citiy represents 
unacceptable to the 
United States.
would willingly place its country at the precipice of  destruction for the sake of  
stability and security. In addition, choosing MAD would mean subjecting the 
country to an extremely high level of  vulnerability, which no democratically 
elected government would be able to sell 
to its public. Only under imminent threat 
of  an enemy that can destroy you does a 
resignation to MAD become acceptable 
or advisable. 
During the Cold War, the Soviet Union 
forced the United States to accept MAD. 
However, under a transforming security 
environment, with China restrained in the 
development of  its nuclear arsenal and Russia only investing modestly in 
nuclear weapons, what is compelling the United States to remain within the 
structure of  MAD? Is it out of  habit or convention of  security relations left 
from the Cold War? Or is it a sense of  altruism?  
In fact, without Russia or China forcing the United States to remain 
constrained within MAD logic, the domestic pressure or demands for a with-
drawal from MAD is likely to grow within the United States. The liberal arms 
control community may lack sufficiently persuasive arguments to convince 
the general public of  the wisdom of  willingly staying within a framework that 
allows for the possibility of  the destruction of  its society.
In this sense, the debate about whether there is life beyond MAD is neither 
misleading nor irrelevant. The obvious alternative to MAD is nuclear pri-
macy. Nuclear primacy was the goal of  nuclear strategies before the advent of  
MAD, and nuclear strategies will likely return to it afterwards. Yet, it must be 
recognized that if  American nuclear primacy was unacceptable to the Soviet 
Union throughout the early period of  nuclear weapons development (from 
1945 to the late 1950s), it will surely be unacceptable now as well. Russia will 
not be humbled by a new U.S. nuclear primacy when it believes that the new 
situation is real. If  MAD dissipates, Russia will certainly take measures to 
catch up with the United States and restore the balance, though perhaps in 
a different form: a new MAD, if  you will. Historically, this course of  events 
would alternate between positions of  nuclear primacy and MAD. 
The current vociferous reaction in Russia to Press and Lieber’s analysis that 
the United States may have reached nuclear primacy should be understood in 
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this context. Russian experts’ rebuttals do not mean that they are in a state of  
denial or that there is no concern about potential American nuclear primacy. 
Rather, they merely do not believe that it has materialized at this point in 
time.
If  indeed MAD is eroding, then there is certainly a concern that a change 
to the new MAD security environment could be more destabilizing than a 
continuation of  the current MAD structure. Restoring MAD would likely 
be accompanied by a qualitative and quantitative arms race that would have 
negative consequences for broader political and geopolitical relations. Yet the 
temptation to escape the logic of  mutually assured destruction may be too 
powerful to resist.
For the arms control community, this may lead to the unexpected conclu-
sion that for the sake of  international peace, security and stability, it would be 
more advisable and realistic to call on Russia to take steps to underpin and 
reinforce MAD rather than require the United States to remain within MAD 
through goodwill. Expecting the U.S. government to remain within MAD 
based on altruism or by principles other than its national interest, based on 
the judgment of  this author, is untenable in the long run and morally flawed.
The question remains open: are there other alternatives to MAD besides 
nuclear primacy? They are not apparent, but they may exist and other ways of  
heading off  the trend toward MAD should be thoroughly explored.
Nuclear Strategy without Ideology
Mutual assured destruction seems fundamentally irrelevant in the absence 
of  ideological conflict as it existed during the Cold War.  The United States 
and the Soviet Union had reason to threaten annihilation against each other 
throughout the Cold War. It was existential war. By nature, the Cold War was 
waged by zero-sum calculus. Nuclear weapons were first intended to help gain 
the advantage in a confrontation; however, with the emergence of  MAD, the 
nature of  the zero-sum game was dramatically revised: it was very possible, 
even likely, that both America and Russia would lose in a nuclear conflict. 
Thus, the strategic paradigm became dominated by a lose-lose option. And 
thus, “not losing together” became a sort of  win-win option, which demanded 
codification of  MAD through treaties.
In other words, MAD turned the Cold War into a complete stalemate. 
With all the moral flaws intrinsic to it, MAD could only be adopted under 
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Cold War pressures. However, the end of  that era also brought the end of  
ideological confrontation.  There is no other ideological (or non-ideological) 
conflict between the United States and Russia that can justify a readiness to 
devastate each other. Absent an ideological raison d’être for MAD, explor-
ing possible nuclear relations in a bilateral (U.S.-Russian) or perhaps trilateral 
(U.S.-Russian-Chinese) format would be helpful to understand the conditions 
under which these countries would consider the use of  nuclear weapons in 
the current security environment. 
However, it seems that no one has yet figured out how to move beyond the 
rationale of  MAD and the Cold War ideological battle underpinning it. After 
such a long period in which the nuclear powers held nuclear guns to each 
other’s heads, both sides still hesitate to put them down. Paradoxically, this is 
the most powerful, if  not the only, means of  interdependence the Americans 
and Russians have.  Unless other forms of  co-dependence emerge, in energy 
or other spheres that can have a less-lethal deterrent characteristic, Russia will 
remain interested in nuclear deterrence 
and MAD in its relations with the United 
States. 
Throughout the 1990s, the argument 
was popular in Russia that the United 
States would be much tougher on a Russia 
devoid of  nuclear weapons. Consequently, 
nuclear weapons were taken as the pri-
mary vehicle underpinning Russia’s “great 
power” status. Nuclear weapons were also 
widely perceived as the only available tool to compensate for the outstand-
ing military disparity between America’s growing power and Russia’s relative 
decline. Presently, Russia continues to view nuclear weapons as a compensa-
tion for that loss of  parity. Yet, the nature of  its rationale has shifted. With 
the growth of  what can be seen as a deep Russian skepticism of  the United 
States -- Russia is no longer considered a threat, but it is not expected to be-
come a partner with the United States – Russia is losing its place of  strategic 
importance. Nuclear weapons and a continuation of  MAD appear to be the 
only means to preserve a measure of  “strategic attention” towards Russia. 
Thus, if  the viewpoint prevalent in the 1990s was, “The United States would 
bring harm to us, if  not for nuclear weapons;” the formula now is, “The 
United States would not care about us at all, if  not for nuclear weapons.” Until 
The temptation to 
escape the logic of 
mutually assured 
destruction may be too 
powerful to resist.
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Russia has other assets of  strategic importance, nuclear weapons and MAD 
will continue to be very important for Russia. 
Energy resources may be emerging as Russia’s new strategic assets. Although 
there is a growing confluence of  energy and politics, Russia still does not feel 
powerful or dominant enough in this sector to be sure that energy could act as 
a substitute for nuclear weapons as “insurance” against strategic loss. Nuclear 
strategy, at least on the Russian side, looks more and more like a “hedging” 
strategy.  Ideologically, the United States and Russia do not need MAD and 
could go beyond nuclear deterrence. But presently, there is no viable alterna-
tive for nuclear deterrence relations.
MAD: Beyond the Bilateral Structure?
Another fundamental question is whether mutually assured destruction can 
exist beyond a bilateral U.S.-Russian format. If  a trilateral deterrent arrange-
ment emerges between the United States, Russia and China – a scenario that 
grows increasingly likely as American nuclear posture takes China more and 
more into account – will the traditional MAD structure continue to exist? Or 
will it take some other form? What would the U.S. nuclear arsenal look like if  
it was designed to assure destruction to both Russia and China in one strike? 
The problem goes beyond technical issues of  whether one party (likely the 
United States) would have sufficient numbers and capability to carry out a 
first strike against Russia and China. The real issue would be in terms of  the 
new strategic configuration and its stability. In a bilateral MAD relationship, 
mistrust was compensated for by a calculation that nuclear war was not in 
either party’s interest. But in a MAD arrangement with three or more actors, 
party A may theoretically have an interest in war between the other two ac-
tors, assuming that war did not involve party A.  In a trilateral MAD format, 
mistrust may be compounded by suspicion that one of  the parties has an 
interest in nuclear war between the other two. Bilateral MAD was inherently 
stable and acceptable, because mistrust was offset by strategic clarity while a 
trilateral MAD maintains, even complicates the mistrust between parties with-
out any strategic clarity. MAD is likely to be destabilizing and dysfunctional as 
a strategy to maintain peace in a triangular relationship.
In a situation of  U.S. nuclear superiority, let alone nuclear primacy, Russia 
and China could cooperate to optimize their position confronting the United 
States. This would, in essence, be reverting to a derivative form of  the tra-
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ditional bilateral MAD, but on worse terms for the United States. Naturally, 
there are many reasons to question the possibility of  a Russian-Chinese nuclear 
alliance. The likelihood of  such an alliance at this time seems small, yet when 
they discover that traditional MAD calculations do not help to stabilize nuclear 
competition, some form of  nuclear triangle may emerge as the only option.
Beyond the bilateral format, MAD looks risky and unstable. If  the nuclear 
triangle continues to emerge, it will probably give birth to a new strategic 
architecture. This author would suggest that concepts like “minimum deter-
rence,” which has already been theoretically available for a while but not useful 
for Russia and the United States as they remain within MAD, should be given 
more serious attention.
Conclusions
MAD is a strategy of  necessity. Without the ideological opposition that 
defined the Cold War, MAD has become outdated and morally unjustifiable. 
It cannot be maintained as a policy of  choice. Consequently, if  Russia does 
not make efforts to reinforce strategic requisite for MAD, the doctrine will 
inevitably be challenged. The emergence of  a nuclear U.S.-Russian-Chinese 
triangle will further add to the erosion of  MAD, as it may not be as stable and 
useful as in its bilateral form. Currently, the only currently available option 
beyond MAD is U.S. nuclear primacy. This will not be acceptable to Russia, 
which, when it comprehends the emergence of  this new nuclear status, will 
force the United States back into MAD. Understandably, U.S. resistance will 
only add to political complexities and the overall deterioration of  relations, 
but may not change anything in the end: MAD will re-emerge.  
Russia and the United States do not have any reason to remain within 
MAD, except that they do not know how to leave it. Joint efforts are needed 
to explore options regarding how to move beyond MAD without regressing 
toward nuclear primacy. It is likely that the arms control community will be 
tempted to offer the “tested” remedies of  arms control treaties. Certain mea-
sures like “de-alerting” nuclear weapons do mitigate the urgency and reduce 
the risk of  MAD. However, arms control regimes, as they emerged during 
Cold War, codified MAD. At base, the message of  the traditional arms control 
movement is that MAD is acceptable, and can be made more predictable 
through carefully managed treaties. That was true for the Cold War. However, 
this overlooks the fact that MAD was the result of  necessity. That was a 
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relatively easy message to sell to the public. Under the current conditions 
arms control proponents risk making the fundamental error of  shifting from 
defending the means of  managing the unavoidable strategic balance of  mu-
tually assured destruction toward defending MAD as an inherent principle. 
Any argument directly for MAD by the arms control community is highly 
vulnerable to rational and moral criticism.  
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